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The ﬂow of inward foreign direct investments (FDI) to Japan has in-
creased dramatically since the latter half of the 1990s. According to Japan’s
international-investment-position statistics, the stock of inward FDI in
Japan rose 3.4 fold to 10.1 trillion yen during the six years from 1998 to
2004. Although Japan’s inward FDI stock/GDP ratio (2.0 percent in 2004)
is only about one seventh of the corresponding value of the United States
(14.1 percent in 2003), employment in foreign aﬃliates as a share of total
employment is 2.75 percent, which is equivalent to about half of the corre-
sponding value, 5.61 percent for the United States (table 11.1).
FDI is a form of international capital ﬂows that are accompanied by in-
tangible assets, such as technology, management skills, and marketing
know-how. Because of such intangible assets, foreign-owned ﬁrms will have
higher productivity and higher proﬁt rates. International economics theory
suggests that the inﬂow of such intangible assets should beneﬁt Japan. Be-
ing aware of this beneﬁt, the Japanese government set the goal to double the
inward FDI stock relative to GDP, ﬁrst in 2003 and again in 2006, as part
of its policies to restructure the Japanese economy and boost economic
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JAFF  JAFF  JAFF (20%,  USAFF (10%, 
(33.4%) (33.4%) single owner) single owner)
Industry 1996 2001 2001 1997
Food products 0.29 0.34 1.32 8.38
Textiles & apparel 0.15 0.17 0.93 5.83
Wood and paper products 0.06 0.16 0.83 4.95
Publishing & printing 0.13 0.22 0.38 7.83
Chemical products 3.61 3.27 13.5 21.8
Drugs & medicine 7.21 15.49 15.27 31.9
Petroleum and coal products 7.24 2.91 2.31 22.2
Plastic products 0.41 0.45 3.22 10.03
Rubber products 1.08 1.15 2.81 40.18
Ceramic, stone and clay 0.28 0.35 1.55 21.45
Iron & steel 0.01 0.13 0.27 19.35
Non-ferrous metals 1.61 0.44 7.72 15.73
Metal products 0.31 0.2 0.72 7.52
General machinery 1.68 1.78 6.82 12.75
Electrical machinery 2.46 2.48 12.51 13.78
Motor vehicles & parts 4.72 10.79 18.32 15.6
Miscellaneous transport equipment 0.7 0.62 12.71 4.23
Precision instruments 0.41 0.9 5.04 11.16
Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.47 0.72 1.71 6.62
Manufacturing total 1.36 1.94 5.91 10.78
Construction & civil engineering 0.05 0.05 0.03 1.72
Electricity, gas, steam and water 
supply, etc. 0 0 0.04 1.96
Wholesale trade 2.31 2.57 4.24 7.89
Retail trade 0.29 0.49 0.77 4.5
Financial intermediary services 1.47 1.75 10 6.1
Insurance 1.67 6.69 12.57 6.4
Real estate 0.02 0.08 0.28 1.64
Transportation & postal service 0.5 0.27 3.52 4.82
Telecommunications & broadcasting 0.22 2.31 6.55 7.66
Education & research institutes 0.34 0.97 1.76 6.39
Medical services, health and hygiene 0.02 0.04 0.16 1.99
Computer programming & Information
services 1.83 2.55 4.33 3.88
Goods & equipment rental & leasing 0.88 1.2 0.49 3.66
Other business services 0.52 1.71 2.1 4.77
Eating & drinking places 1.58 2.36 3.89 2.48
Other personal services 0.12 0.39 0.38 4.23
Other services 0.01 0 0 n.a.
Services total 0.65 0.97 2.04 4.31
Total: all sectors n.a. 1.15 2.75 5.61
Source: Paprzycki and Fukao (2005). Original data is compiled from the microdata of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications’ Establishment and Enterprise Census for 1996 and 2001 and the
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Establishment Data for
1997, online: http://www.bea.gov/bea/ai/iidguide.htm#FDIUS.
Notes: JAFF (33.4%): Japanese Afﬁliates of Foreign Firms (33.4% or more foreign-owned by one or
more foreign companies); JAFF (20%): Japanese Afﬁliates of Foreign Firms (20% or more foreign-
owned by a single foreign company); USAFF: U.S. Afﬁliates of Foreign Firms (10% or more foreign-
owned by a single foreign company).lifted the ban on triangular mergers involving foreign ﬁrms. In addition, 
the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), a government-related 
institution, provides a one-stop window and other services to facilitate for-
eign investment.
Despite the importance of the subject, there are few meaningful empiri-
cal studies on the implications of the increase in inward FDI for the Japan-
ese economy. In fact, some observers have argued that Japan does not need
more FDI. Like FDI in other developed economies, the largest part of re-
cent inﬂows to Japan took the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&As).
The critics fear that inward M&As are dominated by “vulture” funds seek-
ing to reap quick proﬁts by taking advantage of troubled ﬁrms (Nihon
Keizai Shimbun 2003). Another argument is that some inward M&As are
in fact aimed at acquiring advanced technologies (Werner 2003) rather
than at transferring and employing intangible assets in Japan.
According to quantitative studies on corporate performance in Japan,
such as Kimura and Kiyota (2004) and Fukao and Murakami (2005),
foreign-owned ﬁrms tend to show higher productivity than domestically-
owned ﬁrms. However, the positive correlation between foreign ownership
and productivity does not necessarily mean Japanese ﬁrms that were ac-
quired by foreign ﬁrms receive new technologies and management skills
from their foreign owners, or that this transfer of intangible assets is
responsible for their higher TFP (the technology-transfer eﬀect). There 
is another possible theoretical explanation for the positive correlation:
foreign-owned ﬁrms enjoy greater productivity because foreign ﬁrms
choose ﬁrms with higher TFP as their M&A targets (the selection eﬀect).
In a previous study (Fukao, Ito and Kwon 2005), we conducted two em-
pirical tests using ﬁrm-level data for Japan’s manufacturing industry in or-
der to determine which one of the two eﬀects is responsible for the positive
correlation between foreign ownership and productivity. In that study, we
ﬁrst estimated a Probit model explaining whether a ﬁrm is chosen as an
M&A target based on its TFP level and other characteristics. Second, we
tested whether the TFP of Japanese ﬁrms that were acquired by foreign
ﬁrms improved after the investments.1 Estimating a Probit model, we
found that foreign ﬁrms who acquired Japanese ﬁrms enjoyed higher TFP
levels and higher proﬁt rates. In contrast, in-in M&As seemed to have the
characteristics of rescue missions, as they tended to target small ﬁrms with
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1. Although the majority of FDI in developed economies has taken the form of cross-
border acquisitions, studies on cross-border M&As are rather scarce. Conyon et al. (2002)
conducted an empirical analysis on the impact of foreign ownership on productivity in the
United Kingdom for the period 1989–1994. By observing ﬁrms’ productivity before and after
acquisition, they showed that ﬁrms that were acquired by foreign ﬁrms exhibited an increase
in labor productivity of 13%. Arnold and Javorcik (2005) and Bertrand and Zitouna (2005)
found that foreign acquisitions improved the productivity of target ﬁrms in Indonesia and
France. On the other hand, Gugler et al. (2003) did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
eﬀect on proﬁts of cross-border and domestic M&As.a higher total liability/total asset ratio. Estimating the dynamic eﬀects of
M&As on target ﬁrms, we found that out-in M&As improved target ﬁrms’
TFP level and current proﬁt/sales ratio. Compared with in-in M&As, out-
in M&As brought a larger and quicker improvement in TFP and proﬁt
rates but no increase in target ﬁrms’ employment two years after the ac-
quisition. Based on these results, we concluded that both the selection
eﬀect and the technology-transfer eﬀect play a role in explaining the posi-
tive correlation between foreign ownership and productivity.
Our previous study has several limitations, which this chapter seeks to
overcome. First, although our study found that in-in M&As had the char-
acteristics of rescue missions, this result may have been inﬂuenced by the
fact that some in-in M&As are conducted within groups of related ﬁrms. In
the case of M&As within ﬁrm groups, acquisitions are conducted as part of
a restructuring of the ﬁrm group and will indeed have the characteristics of
rescue missions. On the other hand, in-in M&As involving outsiders of ﬁrm
groups may have similar eﬀects as out-in M&As. In this chapter, using data
on Japanese ﬁrm groups compiled by Toyo Keizai Shinposha, we distin-
guish in-in M&As within ﬁrm groups and in-in M&As involving outsiders.
Second, although 72 percent of FDI during the 1997–2002 period went
into nonmanufacturing sectors, such as the ﬁnance and insurance, telecom-
munications, service, and retail/wholesale sectors (which experienced de-
regulation), Fukao, Ito, and Kwon (2005) only examined M&As in Japan’s
manufacturing industry. In this chapter, we look at M&As not only in the
manufacturing sector, but also in the wholesale and retail industry.
Third, estimation results on the dynamic eﬀects of M&As on target ﬁrms
may suﬀer from a selection bias problem. Suppose foreign investors some-
how acquire more promising Japanese ﬁrms than Japanese investors do.
Then the ex post facto improvement of out-in M&A target ﬁrms’ per-
formance should not be regarded as evidence of technology-transfer from
foreign investors to acquired ﬁrms. In order to solve this selection bias
problem, following Arnold and Javorcik (2005), we combine a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences approach with propensity score matching. We employ the
propensity score matching technique proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983). The basic idea is that we ﬁrst look for ﬁrms that were not acquired
by foreign ﬁrms, but had similar characteristics to ﬁrms that were acquired
by foreigners. Using these ﬁrms as control subjects while comparing
treated (out-in M&A targets) and control subjects, we examine whether
ﬁrms acquired by foreigners show a greater improvement in performance
than ﬁrms not acquired by foreigners.
Fourth, using data for the period from 1994 to 2001, Fukao, Ito, and
Kwon (2005) investigated the performance of target ﬁrms for only two
years after each M&A. By adding data of one more year, 2002, we now
study dynamic eﬀects of M&A with a longer time span.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In section 11.2, 
we provide an overview of out-in M&As in Japan. Section 11.3 then pre-
350 Kyoji Fukao, Keiko Ito, Hyeog Ug Kwon, and Miho Takizawasents an outline of our data and reports our empirical results. Section 11.4
summarizes our results.
11.2 An Overview of M&As in Japan
Probably the most comprehensive data on M&As in Japan are published
by the private information service company RECOF. In this section, we
provide an overview of M&A activity in Japan using these data. Figure
11.1 shows the number of out-in and in-in M&A cases in Japan by year.
Both M&A cases have dramatically increased since the end of the 1990s.
Several factors seem to have contributed to the increase in M&A cases
during this period. First, in order to speed up the restructuring of Japan-
ese ﬁrms, Japan’s corporate law was amended at the end of the 1990s to
facilitate M&As. Second, advances in information and communication
technology, as well as deregulation during the 1990s, mean the optimal size
and optimal scope of ﬁrms in many sectors, such as electronics, pharma-
ceuticals, telecommunications, ﬁnance, insurance, and commerce may
have changed. Third, deregulation in Japan has removed barriers to inward
FDI in some industries, such as broadcasting, telecommunications, ﬁ-
nance, and insurance. Fourth, there was a worldwide boom in M&As dur-
ing this period and foreign investors, including private equity funds, and
foreign agents of M&A, including investment banks, brought their M&A
techniques and the M&A boom to Japan. Fifth, as a result of the prolonged
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Fig. 11.1 Number of in-in and out-in M&A transactions in Japan by year: 
1994–2002
Source: RECOF (2003).
Note: M&A transactions include mergers, purchases of substantial minority interests, and
purchases of additional shares and acquisitions.recession and the ﬁnancial crisis in 1998, Japanese stock prices plunged
and ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms and banks were forced to unwind their
cross-shareholdings, creating a ﬁre sale situation that allowed foreign ﬁrms
to acquire Japanese companies.
Probably as a result of the last three of these factors, the rapid increase
in out-in M&As preceded the boom for in-in M&As (ﬁgure 11.1). Figure
11.2 shows the number of out-in M&A cases by source region and by year.
United States and European ﬁrms were the major investors. One interest-
ing new trend is that since 2000 investments from Asian countries have also
been increasing. Among the total ninety-seven out-in M&As involving
ﬁrms from Asia in the period between 1994–2002, thirty-six involved ﬁrms
from China, twenty-four from Korea, nineteen from Taiwan, and eight
from Singapore.
An interesting question is whether there are any diﬀerences in the in-
dustry distribution of target ﬁrms between M&A investments from West-
ern countries and from Asia. Table 11.2 shows the industry distribution of
out-in M&A target ﬁrms by source region. Compared with investments
from Western countries, M&A investments from Asia tend to be concen-
trated in electrical machinery, communication and broadcasting, and soft-
ware. One possible explanation regarding these diﬀerences is that Asian
ﬁrms conduct M&A investments in Japan in order to gain access to the
technology of Japanese high-tech ﬁrms.
Another issue concerns the extent to which the out-in M&A boom in
Japan was dominated by private equity funds (vulture funds). Table 11.3,
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Fig. 11.2 Number of out-in M&A transactions in Japan by year and by regions
Source: RECOF (2003).
Note: M&A transactions include mergers, purchases of substantial minority interests, and
purchases of additional shares and acquisitions.Table 11.2 Industry distribution of target ﬁrms in out-in M&A transactions: By
source region, 1994–2002
Source region
Target ﬁrms’ industry USA Europe Asia Other countries
Mining 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0
Construction 1.6 1.0 0.0 8.0
Food 1.9 1.0 2.1 0.0
Textiles 0.0 0.5 2.1 0.0
Paper and pulp 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0
Chemicals 2.6 13.6 3.1 0.0
Medical supplies 2.3 7.1 1.0 0.0
Petroleum and coal 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Rubber 0.6 0.0 1.0 0.0
Publishing and printing 1.0 1.0 0.0 4.0
Stone, clay and glass 0.3 2.0 1.0 0.0
Steel 1.0 0.0 2.1 0.0
Nonferrous metals 1.3 2.0 3.1 4.0
General machinery 4.5 5.1 3.1 4.0
Transportation 5.5 10.1 3.1 0.0
Precision machinery 1.0 1.0 2.1 4.0
Other manufacturing 0.6 0.0 0.0 4.0
General trading company 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.0
Food wholesale 0.6 2.0 0.0 4.0
Medical-supplies wholesale 0.0 0.5 0.0 4.0
Other wholesale 9.1 8.1 8.2 12.0
Department stores 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Supermarkets, convenience stores 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other retail 0.6 2.5 0.0 0.0
Food services 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Banks 1.3 1.5 0.0 0.0
Life insurance, damage insurance 1.6 3.0 0.0 0.0
Security 2.9 1.0 8.2 0.0
Other ﬁnance 7.1 5.6 0.0 4.0
Transportation, warehouses 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.0
Communication, broadcasting 7.8 5.1 12.4 8.0
Real estate, hotels 1.3 1.5 2.1 0.0
Amusement 1.6 1.5 2.1 0.0
Software 16.8 6.1 12.4 12.0
Services 11.3 5.6 6.2 8.0
Total # of out-in M&As 309 198 97 25
Source: RECOF (2003).
Notes: All ﬁgures are in %. M&A transactions include mergers, purchases of substantial mi-
nority interests, and purchases of additional shares and acquisitions.which shows the number of out-in acquisitions by purchasers’ industry and
by target ﬁrms’ industry, provides a clue. The table shows that out-in
M&As in the same industry are much more common than cross-industry
out-in M&As. There were only seven acquisitions of Japanese manufac-
turing ﬁrms by foreign investors from the ﬁnancial sector, which includes
M&As by private equity funds. It is also interesting to note that in the case
of out-in M&As in the commerce sector, the majority of purchasers were
manufacturing ﬁrms (see table 11.3). This is probably because manufac-
turers of diﬀerentiated products, such as automobiles and electronic ma-
chinery, usually try to integrate the overseas sales of their products in order
to control and promote their exports.
11.3 Research Approach, Empirical Model, and Results
Attempts to provide a theoretical explanation for changes in ownership
and the causes and consequences of acquisitions have produced two diﬀer-
ent hypotheses: the synergy hypothesis and the managerial-discipline hy-
pothesis.2 The synergy hypothesis claims acquisitions take place when the
value of the combined new hierarchical ﬁrm group to be created by the ac-
quisition is expected to be greater than the sum of the values of the inde-
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2. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) and McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) tested these hypothe-
ses using U.S. plant level data. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) found that ﬁrms with low pro-
ductivity were chosen and productivity increased after the acquisition. McGuckin and
Nguyen (1995) found a positive relationship between changes in ownership and both initial
productivity and productivity growth after the acquisition.
Table 11.3 Number of out-in acquisition cases by purchasers’ industry and by target ﬁrms’
industry: 1994–2002
Target ﬁrms’ industry
Purchasers’ Other Primary  industry 
industry Manufacturing Commerce Finance services and construction Total
Manufacturing 118(98) 31 0 13 0 162
Commerce 2 8(7) 0 1 0 11
Finance 7 4 32(23) 16 0 59
Other services 8 4 5 54(47) 2 73
Primary industry and 
construction 2 0 0 0 4(4) 6
Total 137 47 37 84 6 311
Source: RECOF (2003).
Notes: Figures in parentheses denote the number of acquisition cases between the same industries at a
2-digit industry classiﬁcation. (See table 11.2 for the 2-digit industry classiﬁcation.)pendent ﬁrms. As Nguyen and Ollinger (2002) have pointed out, if an ac-
quisition is motivated by this synergy eﬀect, acquiring ﬁrms tend to target
only productive and eﬃcient ﬁrms. After a merger, synergies between the
ﬁrms are expected to improve the performance of the acquired ﬁrm. In
contrast, the managerial-discipline hypothesis claims acquisitions are
driven by the intention to strengthen managerial control over entrenched
managers, who try to maximize their own beneﬁts rather than owners’
wealth. Therefore, takeover targets are likely to be ineﬃcient ﬁrms and
their performance, especially the rate of return on capital, is expected to
improve after the acquisition (Jensen 1988).
In our previous study, Fukao, Ito, and Kwon (2005), we examined the
characteristics of ﬁrms acquired by in-in and out-in M&As by estimating
Probit models. We also estimated the dynamic eﬀects of M&As on target
ﬁrms by regressing changes in performance on a set of control variables
and dummy variables which represent ﬁrms acquired by in-in or out-in
M&As. Through these estimations, we found foreign ﬁrms acquired better
performing Japanese ﬁrms with higher TFP levels and higher proﬁt rates.
Moreover, out-in M&As improved target ﬁrms’ TFP level and current
proﬁt-sales ratio, and compared with in-in M&As, out-in M&As brought
a larger and quicker improvement in the performance of acquired ﬁrms.
Therefore, we concluded that the motivation for out-in M&As tended to be
to achieve synergy eﬀects, while the motivation for in-in M&As tended to
be to improve managerial eﬃciency. The analysis in Fukao, Ito, and Kwon
(2005) was based on the ﬁrm-level data for the period from 1994 to 2001
underlying the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities
and the analysis focused on the manufacturing sector. In this chapter, we
extend the sample period until 2002 and include the data on nonmanufac-
turing industries. The survey covers many nonmanufacturing industries:
wholesale and retail trade, electricity and gas, information and communi-
cation services, credit and ﬁnance business, restaurants, private education
services, and other services such as amusement and recreation, business
services, and personal services. In the 2003 survey, 27,545 ﬁrms answered
the survey. Of these, 12,946 ﬁrms are classiﬁed in the manufacturing sector
(47 percent of the total number of responding ﬁrms). In this chapter, using
a new dataset, we analyze the eﬀect of out-in M&As on target ﬁrms’ per-
formance for both the manufacturing sector and the nonmanufacturing
sector, following the methodology employed by Fukao, Ito, and Kwon
(2005). We examine whether the eﬀects of M&As are temporary or long-
lasting by analyzing the dynamic eﬀects over a longer time span. Moreover,
we investigate whether there are diﬀerences between the eﬀects of in-in
M&As within a corporate group and those of in-in M&As by outsiders.
However, one possible concern is ﬁrms acquired by foreign ﬁrms show
better performance simply because foreign ﬁrms acquired better perform-
Cross-Border Acquisitions and Target Firms’ Performance 355ing ﬁrms or ﬁrms that would potentially perform well, even under local
ownership.3As Arnold and Javorcik (2005, p. 6) point out, “plants acquired
by foreign investors are unlikely to be a random sample from the popula-
tions. To the extent that the acquisition targets diﬀer systematically from
other plants, a problem of simultaneity between ownership status and other
performance-relevant variables will arise and bias the estimate of the pro-
ductivity advantage.” In order to control for this selection bias, we apply a
matching technique in this chapter. Using this technique, we identify for
each foreign-acquired ﬁrm a suitable domestically-owned ﬁrm for compar-
ison.4 In other words, we ﬁnd ﬁrms that were not acquired by foreign ﬁrms
but had similar characteristics as ﬁrms that were acquired by foreigners.
Comparing the treated group (out-in M&A targets) and the control group,
we examine whether ﬁrms acquired by foreigners show a greater or faster
improvement in performance than ﬁrms not acquired by foreigners.
In order to examine this issue, we compare the growth rates of perfor-
mance measures of acquired ﬁrms with those of ﬁrms remaining under 
domestic ownership using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID) technique.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique compares the diﬀerence in average 
outcome before and after the treatment for the treated group with the
diﬀerence in average outcome during the same period for the control
group.5 However, before applying the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique,
we need to overcome, or at least reduce, the problem of sample selection
bias. Following Arnold and Javorcik (2005), we combine the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences approach with propensity score matching.6 We employ the
propensity score matching technique proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983). In studies evaluating the eﬀects of economic policy interventions,
and so on, data often come from (nonrandomized) observational studies,
and the estimation of the eﬀect of treatment may be biased by the existence
of confounding factors. The propensity score matching method provides a
356 Kyoji Fukao, Keiko Ito, Hyeog Ug Kwon, and Miho Takizawa
3. Many FDI-related studies show that compared with domestically-owned ﬁrms, foreign-
owned ﬁrms tend to be larger in size, more capital- and skill-intensive, and show better busi-
ness performance in terms of, for instance, productivity and proﬁtability. See, for example,
Doms and Jensen (1998) for the United States, Griﬃth and Simpson (2001) for the United
Kingdom, Ramstetter (1999), Takii (2004), and Ito (2004) for Asian countries. Fukao, Ito,
and Kwon (2005) also compared diﬀerences in performance and other characteristics of local
and foreign-owned ﬁrms in Japanese manufacturing and found that foreign-owned ﬁrms
showed a better performance.
4. Arnold and Javorcik (2005), using plant-level data on the Indonesian manufacturing sec-
tor, apply the matching technique and compare TFP levels and other performance measures
of domestic plants and plants acquired by foreign ﬁrms.
5. The DID estimator assumes that unobserved macroeconomic shocks aﬀect the treat-
ment and the control group in the same way (common trends assumption).
6. This type of strategy is often employed in studies in the ﬁeld of labor economics such as
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998).
Moreover, the matching estimator has become increasingly popular in international eco-
nomics and other areas of economics. See, for example, Girma, Greenaway, and Kneller
(2004), Barba Navaretti, Castellani, and Disdier (2006) and Hijzen, Jean, and Mayer (2006).way to reduce the bias of the estimation of treatment eﬀects and control for
the existence of the confounding eﬀect by comparing treated and control
subjects that are as similar as possible. Since matching subjects on an n-
dimensional vector of characteristics is typically unfeasible for large n, the
propensity score matching method summarizes the pretreatment charac-
teristics of each subject into a single-index variable (i.e., the propensity
score) which makes the matching feasible.7
11.3.1 The Propensity Score Matching and the 
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Estimator
The propensity score is deﬁned by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) as the
conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment given the
pretreatment characteristics:
(1) p(x)   Pr{z   1|x}   E{z|x}
where z   {0, 1} is the indicator of receiving the treatment and x is a vector
of observed pretreatment characteristics. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
show that if the recipient of the treatment is randomly chosen within 
cells deﬁned by x, it is also random within cells deﬁned by the values of 
the single-index variable p(x). Therefore, for each treatment case i, if the
propensity score p(xt) is known, the average eﬀect of treatment on the
treated (ATT) can be estimated as follows:
(2) α ˆ
ATT   E{y1i   y0i | zi   1}
  E{E{y1i   y0i | zi   1, p(xi)}}
  E{E{y1i | zi   1, p(xi)}   E{y0i | zi   0, p(xi)} | zi   1}
where y1 and y0 denote the potential outcomes in the two counterfactual
situations of treatment and no treatment, respectively. Therefore, accord-
ing to the last line of equation (2), the ATT can be estimated as the average
diﬀerence between the outcome of recipients and nonrecipients of the
treatment whose propensity scores p(xi) are identical.
In the case of this study, we consider two types of treatment: acquisition
by foreign investors and acquisition by domestic investors. Therefore, we
focus on the diﬀerence in ex post facto performance between ﬁrms ac-
quired by foreigners and ﬁrms that remain independent (nonacquired
ﬁrms), as well as between ﬁrms acquired by domestic investors and inde-
pendent ﬁrms (acquired by neither foreigners nor domestic investors).
Therefore, in our case, z denotes one of three possible outcomes: remain-
ing independent (nonacquired), acquired by foreigners, or acquired by do-
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7. For details on the method and an explanation of the Stata program for the method, see
Becker and Ichino (2002).mestic investors. Variable x is a vector of various characteristics of a ﬁrm
such as ﬁrm size, length of business experience, ex ante performance, and
so on. Therefore, by estimating a multinomial logit model at the ﬁrst stage,
we investigate important determinants of acquisition by foreigners and by
domestic ﬁrms and compute the two propensity scores (i.e., the probabili-
ties of a ﬁrm being acquired by a foreign ﬁrm or by a domestic ﬁrm) for
each ﬁrm. Making use of this result, we conduct propensity score match-
ing and compare the performance of ﬁrms within the pairs of observations
matched on the propensity score. In our matching process, ﬁrms are
matched separately for each year and industry using one-to-one nearest
matching with replacement.8
In the second stage, we estimate a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID) esti-
mator to evaluate the causal eﬀect of acquisition on a set of performance
variables of interest. Once matched, the only diﬀerence between acquired
and nonacquired ﬁrms is their acquisition status. Therefore, we focus on
the ATT. The ATT can be estimated as equation (2) above, which in the case
of this study is equivalent to the following equation:




acquisition year s   ycontrol





pre acquisition year   ycontrol
pre acquisition year)
s   {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
where n denotes the number of observations and y denotes outcome vari-
ables.
In the following subsections, we (a) provide details on our dataset (sec-
tion 11.3.2); (b) show the result of the multinomial logit estimation on the
determinants of acquisition (section 11.3.3); (c) examine, by OLS regres-
sion analysis, whether the acquired ﬁrms saw an improvement in perfor-
mance after the acquisition using unmatched samples (section 11.3.4); and
ﬁnally (d) examine the ex post facto performance diﬀerences between ﬁrms
acquired by foreigners and nonacquired ﬁrms, as well as between ﬁrms 
acquired by domestic investors and nonacquired ﬁrms, using matched
samples (section 11.3.5).
11.3.2 Data Source
Our analysis on the eﬀects of acquisitions is based on the ﬁrm-level data
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8. Our matching procedure is implemented in Stata 9 using a modiﬁed version of the pro-
cedure provided by Leuven and Sianesi (2001). As we match ﬁrms separately for each year
and industry (thirteen manufacturing industries and nine nonmanufacturing industries), we
had to modify the program.Structure and Activities) compiled by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and
Industry (METI).9 Our data cover the period from 1994 to 2002.10 We de-
ﬁne out-in M&As as cases where a ﬁrm did not have a foreign parent ﬁrm
with majority ownership at time t – 1 comes to have a foreign parent ﬁrm
with majority ownership at time t. Similarly, we deﬁne in-in M&As as cases
where a ﬁrm did not have a parent ﬁrm with majority ownership at time 
t– 1 comes to have a domestic parent ﬁrm with majority ownership at time
t. Therefore, if a ﬁrm is sold from a domestic parent ﬁrm to another do-
mestic parent ﬁrm, such cases are not counted as in-in M&As in our above
deﬁnition.
Tables 11.4 and 11.5 show the number of out-in and in-in M&A cases in
our dataset. We have 156 cases of out-in M&As and 3,132 cases of in-in
M&As for the period from 1994 to 2002. As shown in table 11.5, our un-
balanced panel consists of 186,080 observations, of which 53 percent fall
into the manufacturing sector. More than 80 percent of the nonmanufac-
turing observations fall into the wholesale and retail trade sector. Table
11.5 also shows that out-in M&As are heavily concentrated in a relatively
small number of industries, which include chemicals, machinery, and
wholesale and retail trade.11Although in-in M&As also tend to be concen-
trated in these industries, they are more widely dispersed, covering all in-
dustries except agriculture, forestry, and ﬁshing.
Data on sales, purchases, total assets, proﬁts, total liabilities, ﬁrm age,
the number of employees, the number of nonproduction workers, exports,
R&D expenditure, and advertising expenditure are taken from the Basic
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. We mainly use newly
constructed industry-level deﬂators, which were taken from the JIP (Japan
Industry Productivity) Database 2006.12 We use the industry-level output
and input deﬂators to deﬂate ﬁrms’ sales and intermediate inputs, respec-
tively. Exports and R&D expenditure are deﬂated by the export price index
compiled by Bank of Japan and the R&D price index compiled by the Sci-
ence and Technology Agency and reported in Kagaku Gijutsu Yoran 2003,
respectively. Advertising expenditure is deﬂated by the corporate services
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9. The survey covers all ﬁrms with at least ﬁfty employees or thirty million yen of paid-in
capital in the Japanese manufacturing, mining, commerce, and several other service sectors.
10. The compilation of the micro data of the METI survey was conducted as part of the
project Study Group on the Internationalization of Japanese Business at the Research Institute
of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
11. These industries have a higher share of foreign-owned ﬁrms than other industries. For
detailed statistics on foreign-owned ﬁrms in Japan, see Fukao, Ito, and Kwon (2005) and Ito
and Fukao (2005).
12. The JIP Database 2006 was compiled as part of the RIETI (Research Institute of Econ-
omy, Trade and Industry) research project Development of a RIETI Manufacturing Database
and Study of Productivity by Industryfor ﬁscal 2004–05. The JIP 2006 contains sector-level in-
formation on 108 sectors from 1970 to 2002 that can be used for total factor productivity
analyses. These sectors cover the whole Japanese economy. A preliminary version of the JIP












Table 11.5 Number of out-in and in-in acquisitions, by industry: 1994–2002
Number of 
Industry Out-in In-in observations
Agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing 0 0 80
Mining 0 5 395
Food products and beverages 2 203 11,799
Textiles 1 44 2,733
Pulp, paper and paper products 2 65 3,264
Chemicals 20 105 7,010
Petroleum and coal products 2 7 430
Non-metallic mineral products 1 64 4,271
Basic metals 1 88 5,451
Fabricated metal products 0 102 7,144
General machinery 10 147 11,349
Electrical machinery, equipment and supplies 15 234 14,919
Transport equipment 7 166 8,616
Precision instruments 5 35 2,624
Manufacturing not elsewhere classiﬁed 9 262 19,812
Construction 0 42 3,206
Electricity, gas and water supply 0 3 392
Wholesale and retail trade 77 1,351 71,175
Finance and insurance 0 8 297
Real estate 0 3 230
Transport and communications 0 13 678
Service activities 4 185 10,205
Total 156 3,132 186,080
Source: Authors’ calculation.price index provided by the Bank of Japan. ROA is deﬁned as the ratio of
after-tax proﬁts inclusive of interest payments to total assets. Table 11.6
provides a description of the variables used in our econometric analysis.
The summary statistics for the variables are shown in Appendix table
11A.1, and a detailed description of our TFP measure is provided in the
Appendix.
11.3.3 Are Acquisition Targets Better Than the Rest? 
A Multinomial Logit Estimation
Using our panel data for the period 1994–2002, we estimate multinomial
logit models designed to test whether a ﬁrm is chosen as an M&A target
based on its productivity or proﬁtability level, or whether other character-
istics are more important. The multinomial logit estimation allows us to
compute the probability of remaining independent and the probability of
being acquired by foreign investors or domestic investors.
We consider three outcomes: outcome 1 (not-acquired), outcome 2 (ac-
quired by foreigners, Out-in), and outcome 3 (acquired by domestic in-
vestors, In-in).13 As explanatory variables, we use the logarithm of TFP,
ROA (return on assets), the logarithm of employment to represent ﬁrm
size, ﬁrm age, the share of the number of non-production workers in the to-
tal number of workers as an indicator of human capital, R&D intensity, ad-
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Table 11.6 Deﬁnition of variables
Variable name Deﬁnition
TFP Multilateral TFP index (see Appendix)
ROA Return on assets measured as: (after-tax proﬁts + interest 
payments)/total assets
log(size) Firm size measured as the log of the number of workers
Age Number of years since the foundation of the ﬁrm
Number of nonproduction  Quality of ﬁrms’ human capital measured as the share of 
workers/number of workers nonproduction workers
R&D intensity R&D expenditure divided by total sales
Advertising intensity Advertising expenditure divided by total sales
Export intensity Export ratio measured as exports divided by total sales
Debt/total assets Debt-asset ratio measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets
13. We were also interested in the diﬀerence between determinants of out-in M&As by
Asian ﬁrms and by Western ﬁrms and the diﬀerence between the outcomes for these two types
of out-in M&As. However, the number of observations for M&A cases by Asian ﬁrms is very
small and almost no observations were left after we screened the data. Therefore, we gave up
investigating the characteristics or outcomes of out-in M&As by Asian ﬁrms in this study.
Nonetheless, as mentioned in section 11.2, the number of out-in M&A cases by Asian ﬁrms
has been increasing in recent years and M&As by Asian ﬁrms are an issue that deserves fur-
ther investigation in future studies.vertising intensity, export intensity, and the debt-asset ratio.14 All the ex-
planatory variables are values in year t – 1, for example, the year preceding
the year of acquisition, t. The model also includes a full set of industry and
year dummies.
The results from the multinomial logit estimation are presented in table
11.7. The determinants of acquisition are quite diﬀerent for out-in acqui-
sitions and in-in acquisitions. In the case of out-in acquisitions, consistent
with the preceding results of Fukao, Ito, and Kwon (2005) and Conyon et
al. (2002), we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher TFP, a higher proﬁt rate, a higher
share of nonproduction workers, a higher export intensity, and of larger
size are chosen as targets in the manufacturing sector (equation (1) of table
11.7). As for the nonmanufacturing sector, ﬁrms with a higher proﬁt rate
and higher advertising tend to be chosen as out-in M&A targets (equation
(3) of table 11.7). This result implies that foreign ﬁrms acquire well-
performing Japanese ﬁrms. In contrast, in the case of in-in acquisitions,
many of these performance measures are not signiﬁcant determinants of
acquisitions (equation (2) of table 11.7). Moreover, in the case of in-in ac-
quisitions in the nonmanufacturing sector, ﬁrms with a higher proﬁt rate
are less likely to be acquired, which is conspicuously diﬀerent from the case
of out-in acquisitions (equation (4) of table 11.7). Another important
diﬀerence between out-in and in-in acquisitions is that ﬁrms with a higher
debt-asset ratio are chosen as targets in the case of in-in acquisitions, while
ﬁrms with a lower debt-asset ratio are chosen as targets in the case of out-
in acquisitions.15 This result implies that in-in acquisitions may have the
characteristics of rescue missions. As discussed in Fukao, Ito, and Kwon
(2005), in-in acquisitions in Japan may be mainly conducted within verti-
cal and horizontal keiretsu networks or within a corporate group, and ﬁ-
nancially distressed ﬁrms are salvaged by other member ﬁrms or parent
ﬁrms through M&As. We will return to this issue in the next subsection.
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14. In the case of the nonmanufacturing sector, the share of the number of nonproduction
workers in the total number of workers, R&D intensity, and export intensity are excluded
from the explanatory variables. We deﬁne “production workers” as the workers who are work-
ing in manufacturing plants and consequently, our deﬁnition of the share of nonproduction
is not appropriate as a proxy for human capital or skilled labor in the case of the nonmanu-
facturing sector. The data on R&D expenditure are not very reliable for many ﬁrms in the
nonmanufacturing sector in our dataset. As for exports, most of exporting ﬁrms are trading
companies and there are very few ﬁrms who export their products or services in other non-
manufacturing industries. Therefore, we think these variables are not appropriate explana-
tory variables in the case of the nonmanufacturing sector.
15. In the latter half of the 1990s, it was argued that Japanese banks were reluctant to ad-
vance loans because of the severe nonperforming loan problem. In order to check whether
foreign capital helped to remove credit constraints, we included the short-term debt to assets
ratio instead of the total debt to assets ratio as an explanatory variable. Short-term debt was
deﬁned as total debt minus ﬁxed debt. The estimated coeﬃcient on the short-term debt-asset
ratio was not statistically signiﬁcant in the case of out-in acquisitions, while it was positive
and signiﬁcant in the case of in-in acquisitions. Therefore, at least based on our dataset, we















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The results from the multinomial logit estimation generally indicate for-
eign ﬁrms tend to target ﬁrms that are more productive and have a higher
ROA, while Japanese ﬁrms target ﬁrms with low proﬁtability. There are
two potential explanations for these revealed preferences of foreign ﬁrms.
One is the synergy hypothesis. Foreign ﬁrms seek synergy eﬀects when they
purchase Japanese ﬁrms. In order to make sure they reap synergy eﬀects,
foreign ﬁrms prefer excellent Japanese ﬁrms. The other explanation, which
is not necessarily inconsistent with the ﬁrst, is an asymmetric information
problem. Foreign ﬁrms are disadvantaged in gathering information on
small Japanese ﬁrms. It is a very diﬃcult task for foreign ﬁrms to correctly
evaluate whether they can restructure a small Japanese ﬁrm teetering on
the brink of bankruptcy and negotiate from their home country debt
rescheduling with the Japanese main bank of such a ﬁrm. Because of this
problem, foreign ﬁrms may prefer better Japanese ﬁrms as their target.
In the case of cross-border portfolio investment, it is well known that in-
vestors tend to prefer stocks of excellent and large manufacturing ﬁrms
with high export intensity. Probably in the case of out-in M&As, the prob-
lem of asymmetric information causes a similar phenomenon. After estab-
lishing a beachhead by purchasing an excellent Japanese ﬁrm, foreign
ﬁrms probably can gather more information on smaller and inferior Japan-
ese ﬁrms and then start purchasing such ﬁrms. But if this new purchase is
conducted by the beachhead Japanese aﬃliate, our data on out-in M&As
do not cover such cases.
In the case of in-in M&As, we found that Japanese ﬁrms tend to target
ineﬃcient ﬁrms with low proﬁts or with a high debt-asset ratio. This ﬁnd-
ing is consistent with the managerial-discipline hypothesis.
11.3.4 Do Acquisitions Improve the Performance 
of Target Firms? An Analysis of the Dynamic 
Eﬀects Based on the Unmatched Sample
In this subsection, we examine how the performance of targeted ﬁrms
changes after the acquisition. First, following Fukao, Ito, and Kwon
(2005), we estimate the following model of the dynamic eﬀects of an acqui-
sition in order to see whether the improvement in performance is signiﬁ-
cantly faster for acquired ﬁrms than for nonacquired ﬁrms:
(4) yf,t s   yf,t 1   α   β1Out-inf,t   β2In-inf,t   xf,t 1 
 ∑
t
  YearDummy(t,  )  ∑
i
 jIndustryDummy(i, j)   εf,t
s   {1, 2, 3, 4}
where yf,t denotes the performance of ﬁrm f in year t and xf,t–1 is a vector of
various ﬁrm characteristics that are expected to aﬀect the performance of
ﬁrm f in year t – 1. As variables to measure targeted ﬁrms’ performance we
364 Kyoji Fukao, Keiko Ito, Hyeog Ug Kwon, and Miho Takizawause the logarithm of TFP, the return on assets (ROA) ratio, the logarithm
of sales, and the logarithm of employment. It likely takes several years for
the performance improving eﬀects of an acquisition to materialize. In or-
der to take this time lag into account, we examine whether the performance
of acquired ﬁrms has improved s (  1, 2, 3, 4) years after the acquisition
compared with the performance in the year prior to the acquisition. As ex-
planatory variables, we use out-in and in-in acquisition dummies (Out-in
and In-in) that take 1 for an acquired ﬁrm in year twhen the acquisition oc-
curs, the lagged values of the two performance variables (the TFPlevel and
the ROA), the lagged logarithm of the number of employees in year t – 1,
and several additional ﬁrm characteristics, such as the length of business
experience (Age), the ratio of the number of nonproduction workers to the
number of total workers, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, export in-
tensity, and the debt-asset ratio.16 A full set of industry and year dummies
is also included,    and  j denote the coeﬃcients of the year and industry
dummies, respectively By looking at the coeﬃcients on the Out-in and 
In-indummy variables, β1and β2, we will evaluate whether the performance
of acquired ﬁrms improved faster than that of nonacquired ﬁrms once
other characteristics are controlled for.
The estimation results for the manufacturing sector on the eﬀects of the
acquisition are reported in tables 11.8 and 11.9. Table 11.8 presents the
eﬀect of the acquisition on the TFP growth rate. Panels (a), (b), and (c) of
table 11.9show the eﬀect of the acquisition on the ROA ratio, sales growth,
and employment growth, respectively. Although the explanatory variables
in all the equations are exactly same as those in the TFP growth equations,
the estimated coeﬃcients of the variables representing all other ﬁrm char-
acteristics except out-in and in-in dummy variables are not reported in
table 11.9. The results in table 11.8 suggest that compared to nonacquired
ﬁrms, both ﬁrms acquired by foreigners and ﬁrms acquired by another do-
mestic ﬁrm show a signiﬁcantly higher TFP growth rate during the four-
year period from the year prior to the acquisition to three years after the
acquisition. The coeﬃcient on the out-in dummy variable is much larger
than that on the in-in dummy in the cases of the three-year window (equa-
tion [2] of table 11.8) and the 4-year window (equation [3] of table 11.8),
which implies that out-in acquisitions may have a larger positive eﬀect on
TFP growth. In the case of the ﬁve-year window (equation [4] of table 11.8),
the coeﬃcient on the out-in dummy becomes insigniﬁcant while the coeﬃ-
cient on the in-in dummy remains positive and signiﬁcant. Therefore, re-
garding the eﬀects of acquisitions on the TFP growth rate, the results in
table 11.8 suggest out-in acquisitions tend to bring a larger productivity
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16. In the case of the nonmanufacturing sector, we exclude the share of nonproduction
workers, R&D intensity, and export intensity for the same reasons as in the multinomial logit























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.improvement than in-in acquisitions three years after the acquisition, but
the productivity improvements from out-in acquisitions do not last long.
On the other hand, the results in panel (a) of table 11.9 indicate out-in
acquisitions lead to a signiﬁcant improvement in target ﬁrms’ proﬁtability
(measured as ROA) three and four years after the acquisition. Although no
immediate improvement in proﬁtability can be observed after out-in ac-
quisitions, the results clearly indicate out-in acquisitions contribute to
higher proﬁtability while in-in acquisitions do not have any impact on tar-
get ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. In contrast, in-in acquisitions contribute to signiﬁ-
cantly higher sales growth three and four years after the acquisition as
shown in panel (b) of table 11.9. Both out-in and in-in acquisitions do not
have any signiﬁcant impact on target ﬁrms’ employment growth (panel [c]
of table 11.9).
In the case of the nonmanufacturing sector, the impact of out-in acqui-
sitions on target ﬁrms’ performance diﬀers more sharply from that of in-in
acquisitions (tables 11.10 and 11.11).17 Out-in acquisitions result in higher
TFP growth for target ﬁrms three years after the acquisition, while the TFP
improvement eﬀect of in-in acquisitions is very small or even negative and
not statistically signiﬁcant (table 11.10). As for ROA, out-in acquisitions
have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect beginning immediately after the acquisi-
tion, while the eﬀects of in-in acquisitions are negative but insigniﬁcant in
all equations except one in panel (a) of table 11.11. As for sales growth and
employment growth, both out-in and in-in acquisitions do not have any
signiﬁcant impact on target ﬁrms (panels [b] and [c] of table 11.11).
Overall, we ﬁnd some evidence that out-in acquisitions lead to an im-
provement in target ﬁrms’ ROA both in the manufacturing and the non-
manufacturing sector. Moreover, out-in acquisitions also lead to a TFP
improvement three years after the acquisition both in the manufacturing
and the non-manufacturing sector. These results regarding out-in acquisi-
tions are consistent with the synergy hypotheses. On the other hand, in the
case of in-in acquisitions, the result that there is no signiﬁcant improve-
ment in ROA does not provide much support for the managerial-discipline
hypotheses. However, we ﬁnd some positive impact of in-in acquisitions on
target ﬁrms’ sales growth in the case of the manufacturing sector.18
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17. As in table 11.9, the estimated coeﬃcients of variables representing all other ﬁrm char-
acteristics except out-in and in-in dummy variables are not reported in table 11.11.
18. As argued by Froot and Stein (1991) and others, a depreciation of the domestic currency
can lead to foreign acquisitions of certain domestic assets. Given the important role played by
the exchange rate in cross-border M&A decisions, we tried to test whether the outcome of
M&As diﬀers during periods of strong yen and a weak yen. We deﬁned as strong yen periods
years in which the average rate for the U.S. dollar was less than 115 yen and identiﬁed 1994,
1995, 1996, 1999 and 2000 as periods of a strong yen. All other years were deﬁned as weak yen
periods. We divided our data sample into the two periods and the results were mostly consis-
tent with those in tables 11.8 to 11.11. However, out-in acquisitions in strong yen periods
tended to lead to signiﬁcantly higher TFP growth in the manufacturing sector and signiﬁ-
cantly higher sales growth in the nonmanufacturing sector. These ﬁndings suggest that theAlthough our results do not seem to support the managerial-discipline
hypotheses, in the case of in-in acquisitions, ﬁrms with a lower proﬁt rate
(for the nonmanufacturing sector) and a higher debt-asset ratio (for both
the manufacturing and the nonmanufacturing sectors) are, as discussed in
section 11.3.3, more likely to be acquired. This result implies that in-in ac-
quisitions may have the characteristics of rescue missions, which may be
one reason why there is no conspicuous improvement in proﬁtability but
some improvement in sales after an in-in acquisition. As mentioned above,
many cases of in-in acquisitions in Japan are conducted within vertical and
horizontal keiretsu networks or within a corporate group. In the case of
within-group acquisitions, since workers and managers of acquired ﬁrms
expect further support by group ﬁrms, it may be diﬃcult to accomplish
drastic restructuring. On the other hand, in-in acquisitions involving out-
siders may have a positive eﬀect on performance after the acquisition in a
way that is similar to out-in acquisitions. In order to test this hypothesis,
we examine the dynamic eﬀects of in-in acquisitions within ﬁrm groups
and of in-in acquisitions involving outsiders.
For information on ﬁrm groups, we use the Kankei Kaisha database
(subsidiary ﬁrms database) compiled by Toyo Keizai Shinposha. We deﬁne
acquisitions as conducted within a group if, prior to the acquisition, be-
tween 20 and 50 percent of the paid-in capital of the acquired ﬁrm was held
by a related company. It is important to note, however, that if ﬁrm A was
partly owned by related ﬁrm B, but the majority of ﬁrm A’s equity is newly
acquired by another ﬁrm C, which did not have a close relationship with
ﬁrm A before the acquisition, such a case is incorrectly included in our
sample as a within-group acquisitions. Using the Toyo Keizai information,
we ﬁnd 518 within-group in-in acquisition cases in our dataset for the pe-
riod from 1994 to 2002, which is approximately one sixth of the total of in-
in acquisition cases (refer to table 11.4). The estimation results, including
the within-group in-in acquisition dummy variable and the dummy for in-
in acquisitions by outsiders, are reported in panels (d)–(g) in tables 11.9
and 11.11. The explanatory variables are the out-in acquisition dummy, the
within-group in-in acquisition dummy, the dummy for in-in acquisitions,
and the same other ﬁrm characteristics as in tables 11.8 and 11.10. In pan-
els (d)–(g) in tables 11.9 and 11.11, the estimated coeﬃcients on the within-
group in-in acquisition dummy and the dummy for in-in acquisitions by
outsiders are reported.
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role of the exchange rate in the outcome of cross-border M&As deserves more detailed inves-
tigation in the future.  Calculated TFP levels tend to be aﬀected by demand shocks. We ad-
justed capital utilization and hours worked by using the industry-level capital utilization ra-
tio provided by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the sectoral working hours
taken from the JIP database 2006. Moreover, we control for economy-wide demand shocks
by including year dummies. We tried to eliminate the inﬂuence of demand ﬂuctuation as much
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Panels (d)–(g) in table 11.9 show the results for the manufacturing sec-
tor. Contrary to our expectation, target ﬁrms of within-group in-in acqui-
sitions tend to show a higher TFP growth rate than target ﬁrms of in-in ac-
quisitions by outsiders. The TFP growth rate during the period from a year
prior to the acquisition to three years after the acquisition is signiﬁcantly
higher for ﬁrms acquired by a group ﬁrm than for ﬁrms acquired by a do-
mestic outsider ﬁrm. As for ROA performance, however, within-group in-
in acquisitions tend to have a signiﬁcant negative impact, while acquisi-
tions by domestic outsiders did not have any signiﬁcant eﬀects. These
results imply that again, the managerial-discipline hypothesis does not
seem to apply in the case of in-in acquisitions in Japan. Rather, the results
may be interpreted as follows: in the case of within-group in-in acquisi-
tions, parent ﬁrms may try to quickly restructure acquired ﬁrms, which
temporarily worsens their proﬁtability. However, after the business re-
structuring is completed, the acquired ﬁrms may be able to enjoy higher
productivity by eﬀectively utilizing managerial and technological re-
sources within the corporate group. Although acquisitions by domestic
outsiders lead to higher sales growth, both within-group in-in acquisitions
and acquisitions by domestic outsiders do not have any signiﬁcant impact
on target ﬁrms’ employment growth.
According to the results for the nonmanufacturing sector shown in pan-
els (d)–(g) in table 11.11, there is a signiﬁcant positive impact of within-
group in-in acquisitions on the TFP growth rate only in the case of the ﬁve-
year window (equation [4] of panel [d] in table 11.11). There is also a
signiﬁcant positive impact of acquisitions by domestic outsiders on em-
ployment growth only in the case of the two-year window (equation [1] of
panel [g] in table 11.11). In all the other cases, the coeﬃcients for within-
group in-in acquisitions and in-in acquisitions by outsiders are not statis-
tically signiﬁcant. Although out-in acquisitions positively aﬀect the return
on assets in the case of the nonmanufacturing sector, neither type of in-in
acquisitions has a positive impact on ROA. In the case of the nonmanu-
facturing sector, our results suggest that there is no conspicuous diﬀerence
between the eﬀects of within-group in-in acquisitions and in-in acquisitions
by outsiders. That is, in the nonmanufacturing sector, even acquisitions by
domestic outsiders do not lead to an improvement in the acquired ﬁrms’
performance.
11.3.5 Do M&As Improve the Performance of Target Firms? 
Analysis Based on Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences 
Estimates from the Matched Sample
Our estimation results on the dynamic eﬀects of out-in and in-in acqui-
sitions in the previous subsection indicate that both in the manufacturing
and the nonmanufacturing sectors out-in acquisitions lead to improve-
ments in target ﬁrms’ TFP and ROA. These results are consistent with
those in Fukao, Ito, and Kwon (2005), although the results of that study 
372 Kyoji Fukao, Keiko Ito, Hyeog Ug Kwon, and Miho Takizawaindicated out-in acquisitions improve target ﬁrms’ performance more
quickly.19 However, as described at the beginning of section 11.3, the
Fukao, Ito, and Kwon (2005) study does not address the selection bias
problem and therefore suﬀers from the problem of simultaneity between
ownership status and other performance variables, because out-in acquisi-
tion targets diﬀer systematically from other ﬁrms as indicated by the re-
sults of the multinomial logit analysis.
Also, the analysis in this study so far has not addressed the simultaneity
problem. Therefore, we now employ the propensity score matching and the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID) techniques described in section 11.3.1 and
examine whether we still ﬁnd that out-in acquisitions lead to an improve-
ment in acquired ﬁrms’ performance even after the simultaneity problem
has been overcome or at least reduced. What we are interested in is the
causal eﬀect of acquisition on target ﬁrms’ performance. However, changes
in performance following an acquisition are not exclusively the result of 
the acquisition, but also depend on other factors. Applying the DID tech-
nique, the change in performance before and after the acquisition therefore
is further diﬀerenced with respect to changes in performance of the control
group of non-acquired ﬁrms. Therefore, the DID estimator removes the
eﬀects of common shocks and more accurately measures the causal eﬀect
of the acquisition.
Using the multinomial logit estimation results shown in table 11.7, we
ﬁrst identify the probability of acquisition (or “propensity score”) for all
ﬁrms in our dataset.20 Our multinomial logit estimation model in table 11.7
assumes that the propensity of ﬁrms to be acquired by other ﬁrms is a func-
tion of the TFP level, ﬁrm size, the number of years since establishment, the
share of the number of nonproduction workers, R&D intensity, advertise-
ment intensity, export intensity, and the debt-asset ratio.21 A nonacquired
ﬁrm which is closest in terms of its propensity score to an acquired ﬁrm is
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19. The diﬀerence between the results of that study and the present one is probably due to
the fact that (a) the data for this study cover the period 1994–2002, which is one year longer
than the observation period in Fukao, Ito, and Kwon (2005); (b) this study uses newly com-
piled and detailed industry-level deﬂators taken from the JIP database 2006; and (c) the ex-
planatory variables employed in the regression analyses are not exactly the same as those in
Fukao, Ito, and Kwon (2005).
20. In order to verify whether the balancing condition is satisﬁed in our matched sample,
we conduct two tests, following Hijzen, Jean, and Mayer (2006). First, we examine the stan-
dardized bias for variables included in the propensity score estimation before and after
matching (see Smith and Todd 2005). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) assume that a standard-
ized bias in excess of 20 percent is large, although there is no formal criterion to assess the
bias. Second, for each variable in the propensity score estimation, we perform standard t-tests
for equality of means of each variable between the treated group and the control group before
and after matching. The results of these two tests are presented in appendix tables 11A.2 and
11A.3. The standardized bias and t-test for equality of means before and after matching in-
dicate that the balancing property is satisﬁed for all of our variables except one (advertising
intensity in the case of non-manufacturing).
21. In the case of the non-manufacturing sector, we exclude the share of nonproduction
workers, R&D intensity, and export intensity.selected as a match for an actually acquired ﬁrm using the one-to-one near-
est neighbor matching method. One-to-one nearest neighbor matching
means that we can use data only from a subset of the sample. Using nonac-
quired ﬁrms as the control group, we conduct one-to-one nearest neighbor
matching on ﬁrms acquired by foreigners and then match ﬁrms acquired by
domestic investors using, again, the sample of nonacquired ﬁrms as the con-
trol group. In the case of out-in acquisitions, our matched sample contains
132 ﬁrms not acquired by foreigners as a match for the 132 ﬁrms acquired
by foreigners (sixty-four ﬁrms in manufacturing and sixty-eight ﬁrms in
nonmanufacturing). In the case of in-in acquisitions, our matched sample
contains 2,827 ﬁrms not acquired by domestic ﬁrms as a match for the 2,827
ﬁrms acquired by domestic ﬁrms (1,369 ﬁrms in manufacturing and 1,458
ﬁrms in nonmanufacturing).
Using the subsets of the sample, we estimate a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
(DID) estimator, which in our case is equivalent to calculating the ATT
based on equation (3) in section 11.3.1. The calculated eﬀects of out-in and
in-in acquisitions are presented in table 11.12. In the case of the manufac-
turing sector (upper panel), a foreign acquisition leads to an additional 4
percentage point TFP growth in the ﬁrms acquired by foreigners two years
after the acquisition. The result also shows that ﬁrms acquired by foreign
ﬁrms enjoy higher TFP growth than the control group equivalent to 2.4
percentage-points at the end of the third year of foreign ownership, al-
though the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant (probably partly due to
the small sample size). The lower panel of table 11.12 shows that foreign
ownership improved the ROA of acquired ﬁrms in the nonmanufacturing
sector at the end of the third year of foreign acquisition. On the other hand,
in-in acquisitions had a signiﬁcant negative impact on the TFP and ROA
growth of acquired ﬁrms. Moreover, as for TFP and ROA, the sign of the
DID tends to be positive for out-in acquisitions in both the manufacturing
and the nonmanufacturing sector, while for in-in acquisitions it tends to be
negative (although in many cases the DID is not statistically signiﬁcant).
However, out-in acquisitions tend to have a negative impact on employ-
ment, while in-in acquisitions lead to an additional 4–6 percentage-point
increase in the sales growth rate for the acquired ﬁrm three or four years af-
ter the acquisition, in the case of the manufacturing sector. Although many
of the DID estimators are not statistically signiﬁcant, foreign acquisitions
tend to be associated with cost cutting and proﬁt or productivity improve-
ments, while domestic acquisitions tend to be associated with increases in
output.
The results from the matched sample indicate foreign acquisitions im-
prove target ﬁrms’ productivity and proﬁtability, while acquisitions by do-
mestic ﬁrms hardly have any positive impact on productivity and prof-
itability. The signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of foreign acquisitions shows up
only two years after acquisition, implying that the realization of synergy






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.eﬀects from acquisitions or the restructuring of acquired ﬁrms take at least
two years. Moreover, according to the results, improvements experienced
by ﬁrms acquired by foreigners are likely to be a temporary phenomenon.
Although the matching results provide only weak evidence that acquisition
by a foreign ﬁrm improves the performance of acquired ﬁrms, they do con-
ﬁrm that such a positive eﬀect exists, even when the sample selection bias
is removed.22
11.4 Conclusion
In recent years, the Japanese government has been actively promoting
inward foreign direct investment with the aim of accelerating structural ad-
justment and achieving a full-scale economic recovery. In order to examine
whether the entry of foreign ﬁrms does indeed provide a stimulus to the
Japanese economy and contribute to a better performance of Japanese
ﬁrms, we investigated the eﬀects of out-in M&As on target ﬁrms’ perfor-
mance in a previous study (Fukao, Ito, and Kwon 2005). Although the
study found some evidence that out-in M&As brought larger and quicker
improvements in TFP and the proﬁt-to-sales ratio than in-in M&As, the
study had several limitations. This chapter sought to overcome these limi-
tations by conducting (a) a much more careful investigation of the eﬀect of
in-in acquisitions by distinguishing within-group in-in acquisitions and in-
in acquisitions by outsiders; (b) an analysis of ﬁrms in the nonmanufac-
turing sector; (c) a more rigorous analysis by employing propensity score
matching and the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique; and (d) an analysis
using a new dataset that contains the most recent data available.
The results of this chapter were generally consistent with those in Fukao,
Ito, and Kwon (2005). However, the present study also produced several
new ﬁndings. First, we found that there was no positive impact on target
ﬁrms’ ROA in the case of both within-group in-in acquisitions and in-in ac-
quisitions by domestic outsiders. In fact, in the manufacturing sector the
return on assets even deteriorated one year and two years after within-
group in-in acquisitions. The results thus did not support the managerial-
discipline hypothesis, which suggests that acquisitions are intended to
strengthen managerial control over entrenched managers who are more 
interested in their own beneﬁt than the wealth of the ﬁrm’s owners, and
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22. Instead of calculating propensity scores using multinomial logit estimation, we also
tried to calculate propensity scores using probit estimation. In the latter case, we estimated
the probability of being acquired by a foreign ﬁrm and the probability of being acquired by a
domestic ﬁrm separately. Next we estimated the probit model, and then compared the diﬀer-
ence in performance with the matched sample. We found both TFP growth and ROA im-
provement to be signiﬁcantly higher three years after the acquisition in ﬁrms acquired by for-
eigners both in the manufacturing and the nonmanufacturing sector. In the case of in-in
acquisitions, the DID was not statistically signiﬁcant in all cases except one.which therefore predicts the proﬁtability of acquired ﬁrms improves after
the acquisition. Rather, our results imply that in the case of within-group
in-in acquisitions, parent ﬁrms may be trying to quickly restructure ac-
quired ﬁrms even at the cost of deteriorating proﬁtability. Our results also
showed that within-group in-in acquisitions brought a larger and quicker
improvement in TFP compared with in-in acquisitions by domestic out-
siders both in the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors.
Second, we found that foreign acquisitions improved target ﬁrms’ pro-
ductivity and proﬁtability signiﬁcantly more and quicker than acquisitions
by domestic ﬁrms. We conﬁrmed these results by employing a methodol-
ogy that combines propensity score matching and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
techniques. The methodology enabled us to ensure that the characteristics
of acquired ﬁrms and nonaquired ﬁrms are as close as possible and to iso-
late causal eﬀects that can be reliably attributed to acquisitions. However,
we also found that foreign acquisitions lead to a lower employment growth
rate in acquired ﬁrms while domestic acquisitions in the manufacturing
sector lead to a higher sales growth rate in acquired ﬁrms. According to
these results, it seems the outcome of M&As is quite diﬀerent between for-
eign acquisitions and domestic acquisitions: the former is productivity-
and proﬁtability-improving but employment-reducing, while the latter is
not. Although domestic acquisitions improve sales growth, this positive
eﬀect can be seen only in the manufacturing sector. One potential concern
is that our results from the matched sample may not be very strong. A pos-
sible reason for our somewhat weak results may be the accuracy of the
matching. As mentioned in Girma, Greenaway, and Kneller (2004), the im-
portance of appropriate matching cannot be overemphasized. If acquired
ﬁrms experience a surge in productivity just before the acquisition, their
productivity is likely to grow more slowly in subsequent periods. In such a
case, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator based on randomly matched
ﬁrms is likely to underestimate the performance impact of acquisitions.
There may be room for further improvement of the matching methodology
in future studies.
Another possible concern is that the reliability of the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences methodology is dependent on the assumption that acquired
and nonacquired ﬁrms are similarly aﬀected by macroeconomic factors.
However, the bias arising from this assumption is mitigated as much as
possible in this study because ﬁrms are matched in the same industry and
year in our matching process.
Our major ﬁnding that acquisitions by foreign ﬁrms have a positive
eﬀect on target ﬁrms’ productivity are in line with several preceding stud-
ies on this issue in other countries, including Conyon et al. (2002), Arnold
and Javorcik (2005), and Bertrand and Zitouna (2005). Comparing our re-
sults with those of Arnold and Javorcik’s (2005) study on Indonesia, how-
Cross-Border Acquisitions and Target Firms’ Performance 377ever, the magnitude of the positive eﬀect is much smaller in our study than
in theirs.23 This is not surprising, because the diﬀerence in technological
and managerial capabilities between domestic and foreign ﬁrms is much
larger in Indonesia than in Japan, and technology transfer eﬀects from for-
eign ﬁrms to domestic ﬁrms should be less relevant in Japan. However, our
results in this study imply that even in Japan, where many domestic ﬁrms
are closer to the technology frontier, performance improvement eﬀects
from foreign acquisitions are present. Moreover, taking into account that
inward FDI tends to generate productivity spillovers, as suggested by
Blomström and Kokko (1998) and Blomström, Kokko, and Globerman
(2001), our results support the idea that promoting inward FDI and facil-
itating cross-border M&As could help to improve productivity in Japan.24
Since the inward FDI penetration in Japan remains low (Ito and Fukao
2005), there appears to be ample room for improvements in productivity
through inward FDI.
In addition, we ﬁnd that the positive eﬀects of foreign acquisitions tend
to be much larger in the case of the nonmanufacturing sector than in the
case of the manufacturing sector. It is often argued anecdotally that the
productivity of Japanese nonmanufacturing ﬁrms is relatively low com-
pared with ﬁrms in other developed countries. If this is true, the positive
eﬀect of foreign acquisitions in the nonmanufacturing sector may have
very important policy implications: foreign acquisitions possibly con-
tribute to a better performance of target ﬁrms in the nonmanufacturing
sector by transferring advanced technology or managerial know-how.
However, in our dataset most out-in acquisitions in the nonmanufacturing
sector occur in the wholesale and retail trade industries. The majority of
out-in acquisitions in these industries consist of acquisitions by manufac-
turing ﬁrms, suggesting foreign manufacturing ﬁrms often acquire Japan-
ese wholesalers or retailers in order to obtain their own distribution chan-
nels. Although technology and managerial know-how transfer eﬀects may
not be relevant, such cases possibly contribute to the streamlining of dis-
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23. Our results cannot be directly compared with those obtained by Conyon et al. (2002)
for the United Kingdom who used labor productivity as their measure of productivity.
Bertrand and Zitouna’s (2005) study on France, although employing a slightly diﬀerent ana-
lytical model than the one used by Arnold and Javorcik (2005) and in our study, shows that
ﬁrms acquired by foreigners have nearly 40 percent higher TFP than nonacquired ﬁrms. Why
the impact of cross-border M&As on TFP is so much greater in France than in Japan certainly
is an issue that it would be worth investigating. Moreover, Bertrand and Zitouna (2005) sug-
gest that non-European M&As are more eﬃciency-improving than domestic or intra-EU
M&As. This result highlights the fact that the country origin of the buyer ﬁrm matters, pro-
viding a further interesting line for enquiry for future studies.
24. A detailed survey of the literature on the various economic eﬀects of FDI and a discus-
sion of the mixed evidence on productivity and knowledge spillovers to domestic ﬁrms in pre-
vious studies is provided by Lipsey (2004). Although no universal relationships are evident,
Lipsey (2004) concludes that “there is substantial evidence from several countries that inward
FDI has been most beneﬁcial to the productivity of local ﬁrms where the local ﬁrms are not
extremely far behind the multinationals’ aﬃliates (p. 365).”tribution networks in the Japanese commerce sector. A more detailed in-
vestigation of technology transfer eﬀects, particularly in the nonmanufac-
turing sector, is an issue warranting further investigation.
Appendix
Construction of the Multilateral Index
The dataset employed in this chapter was obtained from Kigyo Katsudo
Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities),
which is conducted annually by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and In-
dustry (METI).
We deﬁne the productivity level of ﬁrm i in year t in a certain industry in
comparison with the productivity level of a hypothetical representative
ﬁrm in base year 0 in that industry.
The TFP level is deﬁned as follows:
(A1) ln TFPi,t   (ln Qi,t   l  n   Q   t)  ∑
n
f 1










(S  f  ,  s    S  f  ,  s      1)(l  n   X  f  ,  s    l  n   X  f  ,  s      1)
where Qi,t, Sf,i,t, and Xf,i,t denote the output of ﬁrm i in year t, the cost share
of factor f for ﬁrm i in year t, and ﬁrm i’s input of factor f in year t, respec-
tively. Variables with an upper bar denote the industry average of that vari-
able.
Output: Except for the commerce sector, gross output is deﬁned as ﬁrms’
total sales. For the commerce sector, gross output is measured as sales mi-
nus expenses for purchased materials. Gross output is deﬂated by the out-
put deﬂator derived from the JIP 2006.
Intermediate inputs: For the commerce sector, intermediate inputs are
calculated as (Cost of sales   Operating costs) – (Wages   Depreciation
costs   Expenses for purchased materials). The intermediate inputs of
other sectors are deﬁned as (Cost of sales   Operating costs) – (Wages  
Depreciation costs). Intermediate inputs are deﬂated by the intermediate
input deﬂator provided in the JIP 2006.
Labor input: As labor input, we used each ﬁrm’s total number of work-
ers multiplied by the sectoral working hours from the JIP 2006.







Cross-Border Acquisitions and Target Firms’ Performance 379book values of tangible ﬁxed assets. Using these data, we calculated the net
capital stock of ﬁrm i in industry j in constant 1995 prices as follows:
Kit   BVit ∗ (INKjt/IBVjt)
where BVit represents the book value of ﬁrm i’s tangible ﬁxed capital in
year t, INKjt stands for the net capital stock of industry j in constant 1995
prices, and IBVjt denotes the book value of industry j’s capital. INKjt was
calculated as follows. First, as a benchmark, we took the data on the book
value of tangible ﬁxed assets in 1975 from the Financial Statements Statis-
tics of Corporations published by the Ministry of Finance. We then con-
verted the book value of year 1975 into the real value in constant 1995 prices
using the investment deﬂator provided in the JIP 2006. Second, the net cap-
ital stock of industry j, INKjt, for succeeding years was calculated using the
perpetual inventory method. We used the investment deﬂator in the JIP
2006. The sectoral depreciation rate used is taken from the JIP 2006.
Cost Shares: Total cost of labor is measured as total wages. We used
nominal intermediate input as the intermediate input cost. Capital cost
was calculated by multiplying the real net capital stock with the user cost
of capital. The latter was estimated as follows:
ck   pk  r   (1   u)(1    )i    i       ,
where pk, i,  , u,  , and zare the price of investment goods, the interest rate,
the depreciation rate, the corporate tax rate, the equity ratio, and the pres-
ent value of depreciation deduction on a unit of nominal investment, re-
spectively. Data on investment goods prices, interest rates, and corporate
tax rates were taken from the JIP 2006, the Bank of Japan’s web site, and
the Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly, respectively. The depreciation
rate for each sector was taken from the JIP 2006. We calculated the cost
shares of each factor by dividing the cost of each factor by total costs,





1   z
 
1   u
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Table 11A.1 Summary statistics
Lagged variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Whole sample
TFP 163,812 –0.004 0.204 –5.554 4.024
ROA 163,812 0.048 0.094 –13.249 15.504
log(size) 163,812 5.237 0.998 3.912 11.563
Age 163,812 36.101 15.502 0.000 125.000
Number of non-production 
workers/number of workers 163,812 0.606 0.368 0.000 1.000
R&D expenditure/sales 163,812 0.006 0.030 0.000 7.339
Advertising expenditure/sales 163,812 0.006 0.019 0.000 3.009
Export/sales 163,812 0.022 0.082 0.000 1.090
Debt/total assets 163,812 0.739 0.277 0.000 12.383
Manufacturing sector
TFP 90,075 –0.010 0.127 –4.468 1.297
ROA 90,075 0.049 0.098 –13.249 15.504
log(size) 90,075 5.259 1.007 3.912 11.254
Age 90,075 37.471 15.315 0.000 111.000
Number of non-production 
workers/number of workers 90,075 0.339 0.250 0.000 1.000
R&D expenditure/sales 90,075 0.009 0.021 0.000 0.734
Advertising expenditure/sales 90,075 0.005 0.019 0.000 3.009
Export/sales 90,075 0.031 0.097 0.000 1.090
Debt/total assets 90,075 0.704 0.274 0.000 8.101
Nonmanufacturing sector
TFP 73,737 0.002 0.270 –5.554 4.024
ROA 73,737 0.046 0.089 –3.928 12.229
log(size) 73,737 5.211 0.987 3.912 11.563
Age 73,737 34.427 15.565 0.000 125.000
Advertising expenditure/sales 73,737 0.008 0.018 0.000 0.528
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This is a commendable chapter and a valuable reading. It addresses the is-
sue of the relationship between merger and acquisition (M&A) and pro-
ductivity and company performance. This topic is particularly valuable be-
cause, as stated by the authors, there is a growing concern today that M&A
are dominated by “vulture” funds seeking to reap proﬁts from troubled
companies. As a result, understanding the relationship between M&A and
productivity is particularly important.
Consistent with the previous study, this chapter shows that M&A im-
proved the productivity of the target ﬁrms. However, there is a question of
causality direction here: whether the M&A increase the productivity of the
target ﬁrms or if the high productivity of the target ﬁrms attracts some
companies to pursue mergers and acquisitions. In particular this chapter
tries to elucidate two questions: ﬁrst, whether a ﬁrm is chosen as M&A tar-
get based on its productivity or whether it is determined by other charac-
teristics. Second, does the M&A improve the target ﬁrms’ performance.
This study pointed out that the previous study done by Fukao, Ito, and
Kwon (2005) has a limitation due to the selection bias problem. This study
aims to ﬁll the gap by employing the combination of Diﬀerence-in-
Diﬀerence (DID) and propensity score matching approach. I think this is
a major contribution made by this chapter, which carefully takes care the
issues of methodology by handling problems of selection bias. In addition,
this chapter extends the coverage of the study, which is not limited to the
manufacturing sector, but also includes the nonmanufacturing sector. The
other contribution made by this chapter is the distinction between M&A
within the group and outside the group.
The results show that in the case of out-in acquisitions, foreign ﬁrms ac-
quire well performing Japanese ﬁrms. This was indicated by the results that
the selection of the target ﬁrms was based on higher TFP, proﬁt rate, share
of nonproduction workers, export intensity, and larger size in manufactur-
ing industries. As for nonmanufacturing industries, ﬁrm with higher ad-
vertising and low debt/sales ratio are chosen as targets. In the case of in-in
acquisitions this study ﬁnds no positive impact on proﬁt rates, in either the
case of within group in-in acquisitions or in-in acquisitions by domestic
outsiders. On the second question, this study also ﬁnds that foreign acqui-
sitions improve target ﬁrms productivity and proﬁtability, whereas domes-
tic ﬁrms hardly have any impact on performance. The results seem com-
pelling and supported by strong methodology. Nevertheless, to make these
results more robust it is worth to address some speciﬁc issues:
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ulty of Economics at the University of Indonesia.1. Is the increase of productivity merely due to acquisition by the new
company or it is caused by scale eﬀects? It is true that the matching results
on TFP show a productivity increase after three years. However, the econo-
metrics results also shows that the impacts on productivity vanish in the
fourth year. Could this ﬁnding be attributed to the increase of capacity uti-
lization or scale eﬀect and not to the improvement of the technology that
was brought by the new company? It is therefore important to check the
constant return to scale assumption on this matter.1
2. Some studies, including Ishikawa and Tsutsui (2005) show that a
credit crunch occurred in Japan during the period 1996–2001. Thus, it is
important to ask whether the improvement of productivity was due to for-
eign acquisitions’ lessening credit constraint?
3. As argued by Arnold and Javorcik (2005), improvement in produc-
tivity could also be attributed to preparation for entering the export mar-
ket. Thus, it is important to investigate whether the improvement in pro-
ductivity occurred due to exporter eﬀect rather than M&A. This argument
is particularly important bearing in mind that the result of this study shows
that export intensity signiﬁcantly determined the M&A.
4. It is particularly important to pay attention to the interpretation of
the increase of TFP. It is true that TFP is proximity for productivity, but
one needs to carefully interpret the change of TFP growth for the short-
run, because it can also be attributed to the demand side rather than in-
crease of productivity. This is also true for the short-run case where capital
is ﬁxed. The change of TFP growth for the short-run can be caused by
rigidity rather than by productivity.
5. This chapter argues that M&A signiﬁcantly increased after the
Japanese government amended the corporate law on M&A, deregulated
some sectors and foreign direct investment, and also because of a “ﬁre
sale” due to the economic crisis. It is also of interest to note that these pat-
terns are similar in many countries. In addition, Hausman and Fernandes-
Arias (2000) show that M&A occurs when an institution is weaker. Thus
the increase of M&A could also reﬂect a signal of weakening institution.
For these reasons it is worth it to complete some comparative studies.
6. It is useful to delve into a more disaggregated level, particularly in re-
lation to acquisitions in some manufacturing industries, including elec-
tronics and machinery, and to look at the impact of M&A on productivity
with regard to an increasing pattern of production net-work.
This chapter oﬀers a lot of potential to draw out policy implications, in-
cluding the positive eﬀect of M&A in nonmanufacturing for production
net-work. It comes to my surprise that Japan, as almost the most frontier
in technology, has yet to improve its own technological productivity. It
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1. For detail on this issue see Arnold and Javorcik (2005).raises a concern that in the future Japanese companies will face strong
competition pressures from their competitors.
In sum, this chapter is commendable and oﬀers an important contribu-
tion for the study on the relationship between M&A and productivity.
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Comment Roberto S. Mariano
This chapter extends an earlier work (2005) to further examine the basis for
acquisition and the impact on ﬁrms’ performance when ﬁrms are acquired
by foreign and domestic investors in Japan. In this chapter, the authors use
Japanese ﬁrm-level data covering an extra year relative to their previous
study and extend the scope to include nonmanufacturing industries.
The authors use a multinomial logit analysis (instead of their binomial
probit analysis in 2005) to investigate the basis for ﬁrm acquisition as 
the analysis distinguishes three categories: nonacquired ﬁrms, foreign-
acquired (out-in M&As), and domestic-acquired (in-in M&As). They 
further employ propensity score matching and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
(DID) techniques to account for selection bias in foreign investors’ choice
of ﬁrms for acquisition. This is for purposes of assessing the impact of 
foreign versus domestic acquisition on a ﬁrm’s productivity, proﬁtability,
sales, and employment growth.
The authors calculate the propensity scores through a multinomial logit
model of ﬁrm acquisition—the appropriate approach since the categorical
acquisition variable is trinomial. Probit estimation, as applied by the au-
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mestic-acquired ﬁrms versus others, may result in biased estimates of
propensity scores except in special cases and, consequently, lead to mis-
matches in the implementation of the DID technique.
As the authors point out, the ﬁndings in the chapter are generally con-
sistent with their earlier results. In particular, the authors ﬁnd that “foreign
acquisitions improved target ﬁrms’ productivity and proﬁtability signiﬁ-
cantly more and quicker than acquisitions by domestic ﬁrms.”
In applying the DID, the authors keep in mind that there are three cate-
gories. They use the nonacquired ﬁrms as the control group and “conduct
one-to-one nearest neighbor matching on ﬁrms acquired by foreigners and
then match ﬁrms acquired by domestic investors using again the sample of
nonacquired ﬁrms as the control.” The diﬀerences in measured eﬀects for
foreign-acquired and for domestic-acquired ﬁrms are partly due to the fact
that the matching control sets are diﬀerent for the two categories. The near-
est neighbor choices (from the control group) for foreign-acquired ﬁrms
are based on estimated propensity scores that would be quite diﬀerent from
those used to get matches for domestic-acquired ﬁrms. This could account
for what the authors call somewhat weak results regarding the impact of
foreign acquisition relative to that of domestic acquisition.
The authors appropriately caution that matching must be done carefully
when implementing the DID technique. Indeed, further research on ap-
propriate matching methodology is needed, especially when dealing with
multinomial situations.
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